The Linacre Quarterly
Volume 41 | Number 4

November 1974

The Foetus, His Humanity and His Rights
Donald De Marco

Follow this and additional works at: http://epublications.marquette.edu/lnq
Recommended Citation
De Marco, Donald (1974) "The Foetus, His Humanity and His Rights," The Linacre Quarterly: Vol. 41: No. 4, Article 7.
Available at: http://epublications.marquette.edu/lnq/vol41/iss4/7

Article 7

The Foetus, His Humanity and His Rights

Donald De Marco, Ph.D .

Dr. De Marco is a frequent contributor to Linacre. His current
article examines the relationship
of the word " human" and the
mode of application of that term
to the foetus.
Dr. De Marco is a professor at
St. Jerome's Co llege in Waterloo ,
Ontario.
We know wha t something is
when we know its causes. From
Aristotle to the present, this stricture has remained universally
respectable. While there have
been various opinions expressed
throughout history concerning
which of Aristotle's four causes
should be investigated in any given discipline and how these privileged causes should be approached, they have, nonetheless,
enjoyed a time honored usage,
providing invaluable objective
correlatives for a major part of
Western philosophical and sci entific thought.
We ask the question, " what is '.
that something which exists within a human mother and develops
over a nine month period until
its time of birth?" There is specNovember, 1974

ulation that t his something is
" human." But the word "human"
seems at once both highly appropriate and highly inappropriate.
Further reflection reveals that the
word " human " is not always used
univocally in describing the human foetus and the human ad ult ;
nor is the word " human" used
univocally in describing a human
achievement and human hair.
However, the ambiguity of the
word " human " is resolved when
each of its four different senses
is related to each of the four traditional Aristotelian causes. In
this way, the discussion of how
the word "human" is applied to
the foetus gains the objective advantages that a correlation with
Aristotle's four causes naturally
provides.
The four causes represent a
hierarchic order, the higher causes
subsuming the lower causes.
Thus, the final cause, which sets
into motion the other three causes
and is said to be the cause of
causes, subsumes the formal, material, and efficient causes; the
formal cause, for which the mate-
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rial cause exists, subsumes the
material and efficient causes; the
material cause, which requires an
impetus from its immediately
prior efficient cause in order for
it to come into being, subsumes
the efficient cause.
Four uses of the word " human"
and their mode of application to
the foetus are set forth below in
correlation with each of the four
causes taken in ascending hierarchic order.
As Efficient Cause
The efficient cause is extrinsic
to its effect. Also, as immediately
prior to its effect, it is not, as
such, directly involved in its effect's final ordination or perfection . For these two reasons, the
efficient cause tells us less about
its effect than do any of the other
causes.
We speak of great art works or
great engineering feats as "remarkable human achievements."
In this way, we distinguish them
from natural wonders and attribute to them human efficient
causality. Human art is "human"
primarily because it is made by
humans. However, insofar as humans merely make things, nothing which is materially human
inheres in what is made. This use
of the word "human," therefore,
has no substantial or real application to the foetus; it is used
only to describe an artifact such
as a model of a human foetus
which is employed for instructional purposes.
As Efficient and Material Causes
The material cause tells us
about the fundamental intrinsic
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makeup of a thing. It does not
specify the form or the nature of
a being, but describes its composing parts.
We speak of human hair, human skin, or human protoplasm.
In this sense, the word "human"
denotes not only something which
is efficiently caused by a human ,
but something which contains human matter. Human hair, as well
as any other human part, contains human substance.
Properly speaking, the human
organism produces human parts,
as the liver produces bile or the
salivary glands produce saliva.
Here the word "human" underapplies to the foetus because the
foetus is not produced by one human organism, nor is it a material
part of a human organism.
As Efficient, Material, and
Formal Causes
The formal cause tells us about
the specific organization of a being, its nature or formal constitution. It tells us more than does
the material cause by specifying
how a being's totality is served by
the functioning of all its material
parts.
We speak of a human form to
denote an empirically identifiable
human entity, or human organism. Properly speaking, human
forms or human orgainsms are
procreated by human parents.
The word procreate implies that
the offspring is more than a material part produced by another;
the offspring enjoys a human, organismic form of its own . Since
the foetus is a human form, or a
human organism, the word "huLinacre Quarterly

man" in its formal sense properly
applies.
However, from the foetus's earliest moment of actuality, development, or movement, he is under
the influence of that finality toward which his organismic vitality
tends him. Hence, he participates,
to a degree, in a final human form
that perfects and completes his
present organismic human form.
The word "human" in its formal
sense, therefore, applies properly
but imperfectly to him.
As Efficient, Material, Formal,
and Final Causes

The final cause adds the note
of perfection, of completing all
that the subject is supposed to
complete. It adds to a form which
is empirically identifiable as human a perfection which is normatively identifiable as human.
We speak of a human being to
denote one who has everything he

should have in order to be fully
human, the adult, the mature person. However, to be absolutely
precise, there are no perfected human beings and here the word
"human" refers to human forms
who are well on their way toward
realizing a host of human perfections.
Properly speaking, one perfects
himself in becoming more truly
a human being. In this sense, the
word "human" over-applies to the
foetus. However, it should be added that it also somewhat overapplies to even saints. Nonetheless, one is more human the more
he approximates his final cause,
the more he identifies with what
he ought to be.
The Foetus and Human Rights
There is no intrinsic dynamic
tendency that moves from a human achievement (or artifact) to
a human part (The Picture of
Dorian Gray notwithstanding), or
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from a human achievement (or
artifact) to a human form (Pyg malion notwithstanding), or from
a human part t o a human form
(the formation of Minerva from
Jupiter's forehead notwithstanding). However, there is an intrinsic dynamic tendency within a
living human form (such as the
foetus, properly speaking) which
moves toward a more perfect form
(the human being, properly speaking) . The foetus as an active human form tends toward his perfection as a more complete human
being; the empirical human who
is tends, by his own natural
weight, to become the normative
human who ought to be. Because
of this natural, active tendency in
humans, from form to finality, we
say that everyone has a right to
become what he ought to be. The
claim to be more perfect, to become what one ought to become,
is recognized in the very fact of
that dynamic tendency which expresses itself in the development
of the human foetus. The foetus,
from its incipience, is involved in
his finality; the saint, in the most
glorious moments of his humanity, does not realize the absolute
fulfillment of his finality. The
foetus as well as the saint are
both, t') borrow Heidegger's expression, "moving into the nearness of distance."
The rights of the foetus, there-
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fore, are his natural claims to preserve and develop the dynamic
tendency which is the intrinsic
expression of his human form, so
that he is able to participate more
fully in that finality which is perfective of his being.
Human freedom, then, to quote
Heidegger once more, is "the letting be of what is." "Letting be"
allows "what ought to be" to
emanate; "what is" is the human
form that presents the claim to be
what it ought to be.
In a just and loving, democratic
society, the human right of the
foetus to be allowed to become
more fully human is recognized
and protected. In an authoritarian and power-oriented, totalitarian society, this right is neither
recognized nor protected.
The fact that the foetus exists
and develops within a human
mother, who has human rights of
her own, complicates the pragmatics of abortion where there is
or appears to be a conflict of
rights between the mother and
her foetus . However, no degree of
pragmatic complexity should obscure 1) the real claim the foetus
has for the recognition and protection of his human rights and
2) his status as a human form
already intimately involved in his
finality, at once a human form
and a dynamic process of becoming a more perfect human being.
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